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ABSTRACT
Pre-invention assignment provisions have become
important and commonplace facets of employment
agreements, supplanting common law rules for invention
ownership. Yet statutes in seven states—including
California, Washington, and Minnesota—restrict invention
assignment. These statutes make agreements unenforceable
when a worker invents on his or her own time without use
of employer resources and the invention does not relate to
the employer’s business or the employee’s work. Employers
should be ready to argue why a given invention is not
excluded from assignment by statute, although judicial
decisions suggest many disputed inventions nonetheless
belong to the employer. Statutory arguments
notwithstanding, employee-inventors may challenge the
validity of assignment agreements based on ambiguity in
the contractual language. The defendant in a high-profile
case over ownership of the Bratz line of fashion dolls,
Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Entertainment, Inc., prevailed on such
an argument. This Article examines the limits on
contractual pre-invention assignment, using the Mattel
litigation as a case study.

*

Parker Howell, University of Washington School of Law, Class of 2012.
Thank you to student editor Homer Yang-hsien Hsu and Professors Robert
Gomulkiewicz and Jane Winn for your valuable feedback.

80

WASHINGTON JOURNAL OF LAW, TECHNOLOGY & ARTS [VOL. 8:2

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction ....................................................................................80
I. Employee Inventorship: Default Ownership Rules,
Assignment Agreements, and Judicial Responses ..................82
A. Employer Expectations and Default Rules ........................84
1. Default Rules Correlating with Employer
Expectations .............................................................85
2. Default Rules Diverging from Employer
Expectations .............................................................86
B. Assignment Agreements and Judicial Interpretation .........87
II. State Statutes Governing Employment Agreements...............88
A. States that Restrict Pre-Invention Assignment to
Employers ........................................................................89
B. States that Allow Greater Pre-Invention Assignment by
Contract ...........................................................................91
1. Utah ..........................................................................91
2. Nevada ......................................................................92
C. Judicial Interpretation of Statutory Limits .........................93
1. Use of Employer Supplies or Secrets? .....................93
2. On Employee’s Own Time? .....................................95
3. Relationship to Employer’s Work? ..........................96
4. Result of Employee’s Work? ...................................98
III. Case Study: The Mattel Decision ...........................................99
A. Facts and Posture of Mattel ...............................................99
B. The Ninth Circuit Finds Ambiguity in the Agreement ....101
C. Are Dolls “Inventions” for Statutory Purposes? ..............102
Conclusion ...................................................................................103
Practice Pointers...........................................................................104
For attorneys advising employers .........................................104
For attorneys advising employees ........................................105
INTRODUCTION
Language in employment contracts requiring workers to assign
to their employers any inventions conceived of during employment
has become commonplace as businesses grow high-tech and
experience frequent exchange of employees. However, while such
pre-invention assignment clauses may purport to give an employer
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ownership of all an employee’s inventions, statutes in seven
states—including California, Washington, and Minnesota—carve
out significant limitations to these agreements. 1 These statutes
protect employee ownership of inventions made without use of
employer resources and on an employee’s own time when the
inventions do not relate to the employer’s business or stem from
the employee’s work. Agreements that violate these statutes are
unenforceable. In contrast, two other states have enacted statutes
that supplant the common law of invention ownership by making it
easier for employers to become the owners of employee
inventions. 2 As a result, employers in the former states must be
cognizant that employees may retain ownership of certain
inventions and be prepared to persuasively argue why a given
invention is not excluded from assignment.
Yet even otherwise enforceable agreements can be subject to
attack as ambiguous, particularly as to what types of “invention”
they purport to assign. Such was the case in Mattel, Inc. v. MGA
Entertainment, Inc., 3 a high-profile dispute between rival doll
manufacturers about who owned a prized invention: the popular
line of Bratz fashion dolls. Mattel, the maker of Barbie and chief
competitor of Bratz producer MGA Entertainment, claimed it
owned the Bratz line because it was invented by a former Mattel
designer while he worked subject to a pre-invention assignment
agreement. 4 However, the Ninth Circuit in Mattel held it was not
clear whether the agreement assigned the mere “ideas” of Bryant, a
former Mattel employee, or extended to all inventions conceived
during his employment. 5 MGA prevailed on remand, winning a
jury verdict that Mattel did not own the idea and receiving $137
1

See CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 2870-72 (West 2010); DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 19 §
805 (West 2010); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1060/2 (West 2010); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 44-130 (West 2010); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.78 (West 2010); N.C.
GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 66-57.1, 66-57.2 (West 2010); WASH. REV. CODE §§
49.44.140-.150 (West 2010).
2
See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 600.500 (West 2010); UTAH CODE ANN. §§
34-39-1 TO -3 (West 2010).
3
616 F.3d 904 (9th Cir. 2010), as amended on denial of reh’g (Oct. 21,
2010).
4
Id. at 911.
5
Id. at 912-13.
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million in attorney fees and costs. 6 The Mattel case illustrates the
need to draft clear pre-invention assignment agreements that are
tailored to the employer’s line of work and the function of the
employee.
This Article explores the limitations on employers’ efforts to
acquire ownership of employee inventions. Part I describes default
rules for invention ownership absent assignment, how employers
have sought ownership through agreements, and judicial responses
to these agreements. Part II discusses state statutes affecting
ownership of employee inventions, which either restrict
employers’ attempts to require assignment or allow shifting of
default ownership to employers. Part II further illustrates these
limits with case examples, demonstrating that courts often
determine that inventions are assignable under state statutes. Part
III analyzes the Mattel litigation as an illustration of the role
assignment agreements play in disputes over invention ownership.
I. EMPLOYEE INVENTORSHIP: DEFAULT OWNERSHIP RULES,
ASSIGNMENT AGREEMENTS, AND JUDICIAL RESPONSES
As protection of intellectual property plays an ever-more
significant role in modern business, tensions sometimes arise
between employers and workers over who has the most legitimate
legal, business, or moral claim to inventions made by employees. 7
At the outset, it is necessary to define what constitutes an
“invention.” Defined broadly, an “invention” is “anything that is
created or devised,” 8 including ideas for products or improvements
to existing processes or devices. However, the term “invention” is
often closely linked with the concept of patent protection. 9 Patents
6

Edvard Pettersson, Mattel Must Pay MGA $225 Million in Punitive
Damages, Fees in Bratz Case, BLOOMBERG (Aug. 5, 2011),
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-08-04/mattel-must-pay-mga-225million-in-punitive-damages-fees-in-bratz-case.html.
7
See, e.g., David R. Hannah, Who Owns Ideas? An Investigation of
Employees’ Beliefs about the Legal Ownership of Ideas, 13 CREATIVITY AND
INNOVATION MANAGEMENT 216 (2004).
8
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 901 (9th Ed. 2009).
9
See id. (defining an invention as a “patentable device or process created
through independent effort and characterized by an extraordinary degree of skill
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are a form of intellectual property granting inventors a time-limited
monopoly to inventions that meet statutory criteria. 10 Employeeinventors may devise or discover things that are not patentable but
are nonetheless valuable to the employer. Thus, this Article refers
to inventions in the broader sense. Furthermore, a distinction must
be drawn between inventions and certain creative works of
authorship fixed in a tangible form of expression, such as books or
movies, protection of which falls within the realm of copyright
law. 11
Employee inventions—aspects of which may be protected by
patent, copyright, trade secret, or trademark law—may be highly
valuable company assets. If an employee leaves to form a
competing business or files a patent based on an invention made
during employment, the employer faces loss of potential revenue.
In such a situation, both the employer and the worker may sue to
enforce their perceived rights to the invention. Damages in
intellectual property disputes have increased, as have the costs of
litigation. 12 Companies thus often seek clear ownership of present
and former employees’ inventions developed during employment
through pre-invention contracts. 13 However, employees—
especially those who work in inventive roles—may wish to
or ingenuity; a newly discovered art or operation.”)
10
To be patentable, an invention must: fit “one of the general categories of
patentable subject matter”; not be “preceded in identical form in the public prior
art”; useful; represent “a nontrivial extension of what was known”; and be
“disclosed and described by the applicant in such a way as to enable others to
make and use the invention.” ROBERT P MERGES, PETER S. MENELL & MARK A.
LEMLEY, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL AGE 130 (5th
ed. 2010).
11
See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (2006). Some overlap between inventions, works of
authorship, and trademarks may occur in the area of industrial designs. See
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, MANUAL OF PATENT
EXAMINING PROCEDURES § 1512 (8th ed. 2001), available at
http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/pac/mpep/documents/s1512.htm.
12
Stephen Dorvee, Intellectual Property Protection: Avoiding Disputes,
NAVIGATING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DISPUTES (Aspatore 2009), available at
2009 WL 3344406.
13
See Evelyn D. Pisegna-Cook, Ownership Rights of Employee Inventions:
The Role of Preinvention Assignment Agreements and State Statutes, 2 U. BALT.
INTELL. PROP. L.J. 163 (1994).
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preserve a measure of autonomy and thus ownership over their
creations, particularly when they desire to form competing
ventures. 14
Section A introduces how common law and statutory doctrines
for deciding who owns an employee’s invention do not always
correlate with employers’ expectations about invention ownership.
Section B discusses how employers have turned to pre-invention
assignment agreements to supplant the default rules, and how
courts have generally interpreted these agreements.
A. Employer Expectations and Default Rules
Ownership rules for inventions protectable through intellectual
property regimes other than patent law and for patentable
inventions made in response to a specific work assignment likely
meet employer expectations. However, ownership of patentable
inventions defaults to the employee—perhaps contravening
employer beliefs.
When considering both the common law and statutory rules, it
is useful to distinguish between three types of employment, each
giving rise to different employer expectations about invention
ownership: “specific inventive,” “general inventive,” and “noninventive.” 15 At one end of the spectrum are specific-inventive
employees who are “hired or employed to ‘invent,’” such as
research scientists and design engineers. 16 Employers rationally
expect to own the inventive fruits of such employment. At the
opposite end, employers generally lack reasonable claims to
ownership of inventions made by “non-inventive” employees, such
as shop or manufacturing employees and non-technical employees,
because such employees are not paid to be creative. 17

14

See William Lynch Schaller, Jumping Ship: Legal Issues Relating to
Employee Mobility in High Technology Industries, 17 LAB. LAW. 25, 70 (2001).
15
Robert L. Gullette, State Legislation Governing Ownership Rights in
Inventions Under Employee Invention Agreements, 62 J. PAT. OFF. SOC’Y 732,
733 (1980).
16
Id.
17
See id.
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A gray area arises about who should own the inventions of
“general inventive” employees who perform “[g]eneral research or
design work,” such as software engineers; these employees may be
“encouraged by the employer . . . to pursue his or her creative
instincts, even though they may diverge from assigned work.”18
For example, search giant Google was once famous for giving its
engineers 20 percent of their paid time to work on pet projects. 19
Inventions by general inventive employees may “fall outside the
scope of the employee’s ‘work’ since no specific [task] is
involved, and may or may not relate to the business or research of
the employer.’” 20 In addition, even inventive employees may
invent things far afield from what they are paid to invent.
Ownership expectations of employers and employees about these
inventions may diverge.
1. Default Rules Correlating with Employer Expectations
Outside of patent law, employers generally own intellectual
property stemming from employee creative output related to the
employer’s work—meeting employer expectations. Typically, this
includes output protectable through copyright, 21 trademark, 22 and
trade secret 23 laws, regardless of the type of inventive role of the
18

Id.
Bharat Mediratta; as told to Julie Bick, The Google Way: Give Engineers
Room, N.Y. TIMES, October 21, 2007, available at http://www.nytimes.com/
2007/10/21/jobs/21pre.html.
20
Gullette, supra note 15, at 733.
21
See 2 WILLIAM F. PATRY, PATRY ON COPYRIGHT § 5:52 (2011); see also
Michael D. Birnhack, Who Owns Bratz? The Integration of Copyright and
Employment Law, 20 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 95, 113
(2009).
22
Ownership of trademarks “depend[s] upon who first used the term as a
mark and who the mark identifies.” 2 MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND
UNFAIR COMPETITION § 16:36 (4th ed. 2011). If the employee designed the mark
“in the course of employment and the employer uses it, it would seem clear that
the employer is the ‘owner.’” Id. Yet an employee owns any marks he or she
used in commerce before beginning employment, in the absence of an
agreement. Id.
23
A trade secret that is the product of an employee’s assigned duties is
owned by the employer, “even if it results from the exercise of the employee's
19
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employee. Employers also own the patentable inventions of
employees specifically hired to “exercise his or her ‘inventive
faculties,’” 24 fulfilling employers’ expectations to own the fruits of
inventive employment.
2. Default Rules Diverging from Employer Expectations
Ownership of many valuable inventions defaults to the
employee, potentially contradicting employer expectations. For
patentable inventions conceived by employees not hired to
invent—those of general or non-inventive workers—“an employer
does not have rights in an invention ‘which is the original
conception of the employee alone.’” 25 These inventions “remain[]
the property of him who conceived” them, and “[i]n most
circumstances, an inventor must expressly grant his rights in an
invention to his employer if the employer is to obtain those
rights.” 26
Under certain circumstances, an employer may receive a “shop
right,” or “non-exclusive license to make and use the inventions of
his employee to which the employer has made some
contribution.” 27 Yet the “exact contours of the shop right are not
well defined, and the entire area is generally conceded to be one of
state, rather than federal law . . . that can be characterized as
disorderly.” 28 In addition, a shop right does not prevent other firms
from licensing an invention and offering competing goods or
services. As a result, a shop right may not fulfill an employer’s
expectation of owning inventions resulting from paid employment.
Due to both the uncertainty of common law tests and default
personal knowledge and skills. 1 MELVIN F. JAGER, TRADE SECRETS LAW § 3:18
(2012) (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 42 (1995)).
24
See generally 8-22 CHISUM ON PATENTS § 22.03 (2012); see also United
States v. Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S. 178, 187 (1933).
25
Bd. of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular Sys.,
Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2188, 2195 (2011) (quoting Dubilier Condenser Corp., 289 U.S.,
at 189).
26
Id.
27
5 JOHN GLADSTONE MILLS III, DONALD C. REILEY III & ROBERT C.
HIGHLEY, PATENT LAW FUNDAMENTALS § 17:21 (2d ed. 1986).
28
3 R. CARL MOY, MOY'S WALKER ON PATENTS § 10:17 (4th ed. 2011).
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rules contradicting employer expectations, businesses are generally
reluctant to rely on the default rules. 29 Employers thus turn to
assignment contracts enforceable under state law.
B. Assignment Agreements and Judicial Interpretation
Businesses may seek protection in an employment agreement
requiring the worker to assign, or promise to relinquish the rights
to, inventions springing from the employee’s tenure with that
employer. 30 These agreements serve three important functions:
specifying the parties’ rights, providing notice of those rights to the
employee, and executing the transfer of rights. 31
However, the existence of a pre-invention employment
agreement does not guarantee employer ownership of an invention.
Employees may challenge the validity of such an agreement on
traditional contract grounds, such as unconscionability or
ambiguity. Courts generally view employer-employee agreements
to assign intellectual property resulting from inventions through a
similar lens, typically enforcing them freely. 32 However, courts
may view assignment clauses as a restraint of trade, especially if
they bind a worker to relinquish rights to inventions conceived
after employment ends. 33 Agreements thus must be “reasonable”
and not unconscionable or against public policy. 34 Reasonableness
standards “ordinarily parallel those used for noncompetition
agreements,” focusing on the “scope of what type of invention or
authorship [is] in question and the duration of the obligation to
assign.” 35
Despite broad contract language requiring assignment of
employee inventions, courts often “strive, if the language at all
permits, to limit its effect so as to preclude an employer claiming
29
30

See Pisegna-Cook, supra note 13, at 163.
See 15 GRACE MCLANE GIESEL, CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 80.19 (rev. ed.

2003).
31

See Bd. of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ. v. Roche Molecular
Sys., Inc., 131 S. Ct. 2188, 2194 (2011).
32
GIESEL, supra note 30.
33
Id.
34
RAYMOND T. NIMMER, LAW OF COMPUTER TECHNOLOGY § 4:9 (2010).
35
Id.
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ownership in works which would be considered outside the scope
of the employment agreement.” 36 This occurs because courts
recognize that employers may have more bargaining power than
employees; they may presume terms in an employment contract
(including assignment of inventions) were imposed on the
employee. 37 This allows “a kind of paternalism and permit[s]
judicial intervention designed to protect the employee.” 38 As a
result, contractual language “must be clear and show an
unmistakable intention that the particular matter covered by the
invention or patent is within the scope of the parties’ agreement or
understanding.” 39 When courts find ambiguous language, as in
Mattel, they turn to state common law doctrines of contractual
interpretation, such as looking to industry custom. 40
II. STATE STATUTES GOVERNING EMPLOYMENT AGREEMENTS
Beyond the judicially imposed limits discussed above, statutes
in several states restrict employers’ abilities to require assignment
via contract. 41 Under the majority approach, modeled on
Minnesota’s law, statutory provisions prevent employers from
requiring assignment of inventions made on an employee’s own
time and without employer resources. Yet these statutes include
exceptions allowing employers to require assignment of such
inventions that relate to the employer’s business or spring from the
employee’s work for the employer. When an employment
agreement conflicts with one of these statutes, it may be
unenforceable against the employee. Section A discusses states
following the Minnesota model. However, two states have taken a
different approach, making employer ownership of inventions the
norm, as discussed in Section B.
36

3 MELVILLE B. NIMMER & DAVID NIMMER, NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT §
5.03[B][1][b][ii] (Matthew Bender, rev. ed. 2010).
37
See id.
38
Id.
39
6 RICHARD A. LORD, WILLISTON ON CONTRACTS § 13:17 (4th ed. 2010).
40
NIMMER, supra note 36, at § 10.08[B]-[C].
41
See generally 1 STEVEN Z. SZCZEPANSKI, UPDATED BY DAVID M.
EPSTEIN, ECKSTROM’S LICENSING IN FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC OPERATIONS §
8A:53 (2012).
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A. States that Restrict Pre-Invention Assignment to Employers
Statutes modeled after Minnesota’s law allow employees to
retain more ownership of their creative output by prohibiting
companies from requiring assignment of inventions unrelated to
the employee’s work or the employer’s business. Minnesota
enacted its statute, the first such “Freedom to Create” law, in
1977. 42 With two exceptions, subsequent states to legislate on this
issue, including California and Washington, passed similarly
structured statutes. 43 The “central purpose” of these statutes “is
ostensibly to deter employers from overreaching in pre-invention
assignment agreements signed by their employees.” 44 Such a
statute “does not confer any rights on employers—it protects
employees by rendering assignment agreements unenforceable to
the extent they exceed permissible limits.”45
It is unclear what qualifies as an “invention” under the
Minnesota-type statutes, which do not define the term. Although
one scholar suggested that the statutes should be limited to “cover
only those inventions, discoveries or improvements which satisfy
the higher standards of novelty and level of inventive skill
traditionally associated with patentable subject matter,” 46 such a
narrow reading is not merited by the statutes’ plain language.
Unlike earlier proposed federal legislation that defined inventions
as only those that are “patentable,” 47 the drafters of the state
statutes left the term undefined, suggesting a broader meaning.
However, the Utah statute—passed years after Minnesota’s—
42

See MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.78 (WEST 2010); SZCZEPANSKI & EPSTEIN,
supra note 41.
43
See CAL. LAB. CODE §§ 2870-72 (West 2010); DEL. CODE ANN. TIT. 19 §
805 (West 2010); 765 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 1060/2 (West 2010); KAN. STAT.
ANN. § 44-130 (West 2010); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 181.78 (West 2010); N.C.
GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 66-57.1, 66-57.2 (West 2010); WASH. REV. CODE §§
49.44.140-.150 (West 2010).
44
Pisegna-Cook, supra note 13, at 178.
45
Applera Corp. – Applied Biosystems Grp. v. Illumina, Inc., 375
Fed.Appx. 12, 17 (Fed. Cir. 2010) [hereinafter Applera II].
46
Gullette, supra note 15, at 742.
47
H.R. 15512, 91st Cong. § 402 (1969), 116 CONG. REC. 744 (1970).
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provides an explicit definition of invention. 48 In contrast, the
Nevada statute applies only to patentable inventions and trade
secrets. 49
The California statute at issue in Mattel, Cal. Lab. Code
§ 2870, is typical of the Minnesota-type laws. Section 2870 states
that any pre-invention assignment agreement “shall not apply to an
invention that the employee developed entirely on his or her own
time without using the employer’s equipment, supplies, facilities,
or trade secret information.” However, the statute contains
exceptions allowing assignment of such inventions that either:
(1) Relate at the time of conception or reduction to practice
of the invention to the employer’s business, or actual or
demonstrably anticipated research or development of the
employer; or
(2) Result from any work performed by the employee for
the employer. 50
California courts have interpreted these provisions as operating
independently. 51 Thus, under the California statute, a plaintiffemployer need only show either that a disputed invention: (1) was
made using employer time or resources; (2) relates to the
employer’s business or actual or demonstrably anticipated research
and development; or (3) resulted from work performed by the
employee for the employer. 52 The burden lies with the employee to
prove that a disputed invention is not assignable. 53
Other states’ statutes contain minor differences in language that
48

See UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-39-3 (using the term “any right or intellectual
property in or to an invention”). The Utah statute further defines “intellectual
property” as “any and all patents, trade secrets, know-how, technology,
confidential information, ideas, copyrights, trademarks, and service marks and
any and all rights, applications, and registrations relating to them.” UTAH CODE
ANN. § 34-39-2(2).
49
See NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 600.500 (West 2010).
50
CAL. LAB. CODE § 2870(a).
51
Applera II, 375 Fed.Appx at 17. Cadence Design Sys., Inc. v. Bhandari,
No. 07-00823, 2007 WL 3343085, at *5 n.4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2007).
52
Cadence Design Sys., Inc. v. Bhandari, No. 07-00823, 2007 WL
3343085, at *5 n.4 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 8, 2007).
53
See, e.g., Cubic Corp. v. Marty, 185 Cal. App. 3d 438, 451 (Ct. App.
1986); see also N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 66-57.1 (West 2010).
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may nonetheless affect the balance between employers and
employees. For instance, the Washington statute requires an
invention to relate “directly to the business of the employer.” 54
The statutes also contain notice provisions. The laws generally
require that employers provide notice to employees of their rights
under the laws. 55 Failure to provide notice may result in dismissal
of a claim. 56 The Kansas statute also requires the employee to
“disclose, at the time of employment or thereafter, all inventions
being developed by the employee, for the purposes of determining
employer and employee rights in an invention.” 57
B. States that Allow Greater Pre-Invention Assignment by
Contract
Utah and Nevada have taken a different approach, using
statutes to change the default allocation of invention rights in a
manner benefitting employers.
1. Utah
Unlike statutes following the Minnesota model, Utah law
allows pre-invention assignment of certain “employment
inventions” as the default, even when the inventions are created
entirely on an employee’s own time. 58 When an invention qualifies
54

Wash. REV. CODE. § 49.44.140(1)(a)(i) (emphasis added).
See Waterjet Tech., Inc. v. Flow Int'l Corp., 996 P.2d 598, 601 (Wash.
2000) (notice may be given by agreement itself).
56
See, e.g., Machen, Inc. v. Aircraft Design, Inc., 828 P.2d 73 (Wash. Ct.
App. 1992).
57
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 44-130(d) (West 2010).
58
See supra, note 40 for the Utah law’s definition of “invention.”
“Employment inventions” are defined as “any invention or part thereof
conceived, developed, reduced to practice, or created by an employee”
conceived or created by the employee “[(a)](i) within the scope of his
employment; (ii) on his employer's time; or (iii) with the aid, assistance, or use
of any of his employer's property, equipment, facilities, supplies, resources, or
intellectual property; (b) the result of any work, services, or duties performed by
an employee for his employer; (c) related to the industry or trade of the
employer; or (d) related to the current or demonstrably anticipated business,
research, or development of the employer.” UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 34-39-3(2)
55
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as an employment invention, the statute allows an employer to
condition employment on acceptance of an assignment
agreement. 59 However, assignment of non-employment inventions
made entirely on the employee’s own time may not be a condition
of employment or continued employment, and the employee must
receive consideration “which is not compensation for
employment” for the assignment. 60 No reported cases discuss this
statute.
2. Nevada
In Nevada, policymakers have shifted the burden of clarifying
the scope of assignment agreements to employees. The Nevada
Legislature passed a law effective in 2001 stating that, “[e]xcept as
otherwise provided by express written agreement, an employer is
the sole owner of any patentable invention or trade secret
developed by his employee during the course of the employment
that relates directly to work performed during the course of the
employment.” 61 This statute thus functions as a state law
equivalent to the copyright work-for-hire doctrine. 62 No reported
cases discuss the statute, and it is unclear what changes, if any, the
law has effected on Nevada’s business development. The number
of patents granted by the United States Patent and Trademark
Office to parties in Nevada has increased since the law was
enacted in 2001, following the national trend. 63
One commentator calls the Nevada statute “potentially a
revolutionary change in Nevada’s employment and property
laws.” 64 Based on this statutory scheme, “Nevada has become the
only state that allows ownership of patentable inventions to be
(West 2010).
59
UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-39-3(6) (West 2010).
60
UTAH CODE ANN. § 34-39-3(1), (4) (West 2010).
61
NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 600.500 (West 2010).
62
Mary LaFrance, Nevada’s Employee Inventions Statute: Novel,
Nonobvious, and Patently Wrong, 3 NEV. L.J. 88, 101 (2002).
63
See, e.g., United States Patent and Trademark Office, Patents by Country,
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transferred from one party to another in the complete absence of an
assignment agreement, and without any form of actual notice to the
transferor.” 65
C. Judicial Interpretation of Statutory Limits
Although judicial decisions interpreting the Minnesota-type
statutes remain sparse, 66 a pattern emerges: courts find inventions
to be assignable more often than not. While state legislation
designed to give employees more control over their inventions
passed during the 1970s and 1980s, only in roughly the last decade
has the pace of reported decisions citing to these statutes increased.
The statute in California, a state home to a large economy and
many technology companies, appears to have received the most
attention, including in Mattel. Many decisions occurred at the
federal trial-court level, producing persuasive, rather than binding,
precedent. While the relevant statutes vary slightly even among
states that follow the Minnesota model, “[s]imilar statutes of other
states comprise a type of extrinsic aid which may deserve special
attention.” 67
Once an employer claims breach of an assignment agreement
by an employee’s failure to disclose or assign an invention, the
employee in a state with a Minnesota-type statute must prove that
all four statutory factors are met: (1) no use of employer supplies
or secrets; (2) no use of employer time; (3) no relation to the
employer’s work; and (4) the invention was not a result of the
employee’s work.
1. Use of Employer Supplies or Secrets?
The easiest avenue for an employer to demonstrate that a
disputed invention falls within the statutory exception—allowing
mandatory assignment—is to show use of employer resources or
65

Id.
Annotated statutes reveal about a dozen decisions providing substantial
discussion, as discussed below.
67
2B NORMAN J. SINGER AND J.D. SHAMBIE SINGER, SUTHERLAND
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 52:1 (7th ed. 2012).
66
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trade secrets. Sometimes (as in Mattel), evidence that employees
used employer equipment, supplies, or money to further an
invention provides strong evidence that the invention falls within
the scope of allowable agreements. 68 This is particularly true when
an employee uses a company computer to create, refine, or finance
an invention. For example, a federal district court in California
granted the plaintiff employer a preliminary injunction against two
former employees after evidence demonstrated that the workers’
company computers contained a host of files relating to their new,
competing venture. 69 In Iconix, Inc. v. Tokuda, the company
computers contained, inter alia: source code for the employees’
new website; a database of users of the new website; and a bridge
loan term sheet and taxpayer ID for a new business. 70
Even a small use of employer resources triggers the statutory
exception. In Cubic Corporation v. Marty, a California appeals
court affirmed summary judgment for the plaintiff, a defense
contractor, against a former employee. 71 The employee had
obtained a patent for a device to train airline pilots that was
embodied in a manuscript produced the year prior to his patent
application. 72 The court noted that the manuscript likely was not
developed “entirely” on the employee’s “own time,” as required to
fall within the statutory protection, because he “used Cubic
personnel and funding to add circuitry which was necessary to
make his invention work.” 73 While the employee “argue[d] he
could have developed this circuitry on his own, the fact remains
that he did not.” 74
Although use of trade secrets in invention also may constitute
use of employer resources, at least one employee successfully
demonstrated that his invention was not assignable because it did
not stem from appropriation of the employer’s secrets. In Applera
68

Cf. Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Entm't, Inc., 616 F.3d 904, 907 (9th Cir. 2010)
(stating Bryant showed MGA executives “a crude dummy constructed out of a
doll head from a Mattel bin, a Barbie body and Ken (Barbie’s ex) boots”).
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Iconix, Inc. v. Tokuda, 457 F.Supp.2d 969, 1003 (N.D. Cal. 2006).
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Id. at 989-90.
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Id. at 445.
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Id. at 453.
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Corporation-Applied Biosystems Group v. Illumina, Inc., the
Federal Circuit affirmed denial of judgment as a matter of law for
the defendant employer in a dispute over ownership of patents
relating to DNA sequencing technology. 75 Applera’s former inhouse patent counsel had invented a new way to sequence DNA
during the years he worked for the company. 76 The former
employee “offered unrefuted testimony that he made his invention
at home on his own time,” 77 satisfying the first statutory
requirement for inventions excluded from employer ownership.
The Federal Circuit further reasoned that the employee’s
“inventions existed only on paper-he did not perform any
laboratory work, and he detailed his inventions in a laboratory
notebook that he purchased himself.” 78 The issue was whether he
used any of the employer’s trade secrets. 79 The ex-employee
testified that the invention resulted from earlier work and ideas
obtained working on a different patent, not his work for the
company. Thus, the Federal Circuit decided substantial evidence
supported the jury’s verdict that the invention met the requirements
of the California statute and was exempt from assignment. 80
2. On Employee’s Own Time?
The meaning of the statutory phrase “entirely on his or her own
time” engenders questions about an employee’s expected working
hours and the temporal scope of employment. Employees may
argue that they worked flexible hours or put in such long hours that
they had to develop inventions in part while seemingly at work. 81
In Iconix, the court rejected the defendant former employees’
argument that they worked on their project on their own time. 82
The court looked to evidence that company computers contained a
75

Applera II, 375 Fed.Appx. 12 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
Id. at 14.
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Id. at 16.
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PowerPoint for investors modified on a workday during typical
working hours and instant message logs showing messages
between the defendants between 9 a.m. and 5 p.m. on weekdays. 83
The court also rejected the argument that the employees’ use of a
company laptop on vacation was on their own time, reasoning that
even if it was acceptable for them to use the computer for personal
reasons, any inventions developed using it still had to be
assigned. 84 The court also found unpersuasive the argument that
the defendants “often worked 14-16 hour days” or worked through
the night, and thus that typical business hours were an “artificial”
distinction. 85
However, inventions conceived before or after employment are
made on the employee’s own time. For example, in NeoNetworks,
Inc. v. Cree, the Court of Appeals of Minnesota affirmed a trial
court’s determination that an employee created his invention after
termination of his employment, based on ideas conceived before
employment. 86
3. Relationship to Employer’s Work?
Courts construe the “related to” phrase in Minnesota-type
statutes broadly. 87 This factor functions like the tort concept of
proximate cause, allowing courts to exclude from assignment
inventions insufficiently tied to the employer’s legitimate
expectations as determined by the legislature.
In Eaton Corp. v. Giere, the Eighth Circuit conducted a
straightforward analysis of whether an ex-employee’s mechanical
invention related to his employer’s work, finding that it
“obviously” related and thus breached the employment
agreement. 88 The employee “made light-duty transaxles for
83

Id. at 990.
Id. at 991.
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machinery for Eaton,” then “started designing, with the idea of
manufacturing and selling, similarly sized transaxles for the
purposes of competing against Eaton.” 89 There were “striking
similarities” between the products, and it “would stretch the
imagination and do damage to the English language to find that
[the defendant’s] device was not ‘related’ to Eaton’s business.” 90
Even inventions less obviously related to the employer’s
business may fall within the statutory exception. In Cadence
Design Systems, Inc. v. Bhandari, the district court granted
summary judgment for the plaintiff manufacturer because when the
patent at issue (covering computer-aided techniques for making
integrated circuits) was conceived, the invention was “integral” to
the employer’s business; it “improved the quality and costeffectiveness” of the business’ products. 91 Further, one of the
defendant employees consulted with an intellectual property
attorney, who advised him that the employer could claim
ownership under the employment agreement. 92
The Cubic court also focused on the relationship of the
invention to the employer’s line of work, stating that the
manuscript embodying the employee’s invention was “related to
his employer’s business” and thus did not fall within Cal. Lab.
Code § 2870(1). 93 The court reasoned that the employee “sought
Cubic expertise on his idea” and later sought and accepted funding
from the company. 94
Courts have dismissed two lines of argument by employees
seeking to retain ownership of their inventions that seemingly
“relate to” the employer’s work in a broad sense. First, courts have
refused to narrowly construe the meaning of the phrase to mean the
smallest division of a company in which the defendant employee
worked. 95 Thus, an employee’s work for any portion of a business
89

Id. (emphasis in original).
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is enough to bring the invention within the statutory exception,
allowing mandatory assignment.
Second, the Eighth Circuit in Eaton did not accept the
defendant ex-employee’s argument that his device was targeted at
a market the employer had not entered. 96 The employee made a
device appropriate for snowblowers and riding mowers smaller
than ones fitted with the employer’s product. However, the latter
market “was an area of ‘Eaton’s actual or demonstrably anticipated
research and development.’” 97 Ultimately, the employee took “a
great many shortcuts in time and money spent on research,
development, testing, and specifications because of his previous
work on similar products he helped design and make at Eaton.”
That “he actually designed and made his device at home and after
hours is of little relevance.” 98
4. Result of Employee’s Work?
If the “relates to” element is analogous to proximate cause, the
final element involves consideration of what could be termed the
“but for” cause of the invention: whether the employee’s work for
the company led at least in part to the invention. Courts that find
for the employer on the “relates to” factor might not reach this
factor.
Courts reaching this factor have held against the employer. In
Agilent Technologies, Inc. v. Kirkland, the Federal Circuit held that
substantial evidence showed the invention did not stem from work
performed for the company (based on the employee’s testimony). 99
In Enreach, Inc. v. Embedded Internet Solutions, Inc., a district
court denied summary judgment to the plaintiff employer based on
existence of a material factual dispute about how and when an exemployee developed certain source code. 100 The ex-employee
stated that the source code he developed while employed was very
96
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basic and derived from the public domain, and that he developed it
for a non-work purpose. 101
However, conception of an idea during employment may be
enough to find for the employer on the “result of” factor even if
employees do not perfect their invention until after they have left
the employer. 102
III. CASE STUDY: THE MATTEL DECISION
The saga of the Mattel case provides a useful study on how an
ambiguous pre-invention assignment agreement—even one that
would otherwise be enforceable by the employer under state
statute—may result in loss of intellectual property to a competitor.
Section A discusses the facts and procedural posture of the case.
Section B explores how the Ninth Circuit focused on ambiguity in
the assignment agreement when, absent ambiguity, analysis under
California’s statute suggests Mattel owned the invention. Section C
discusses whether the dolls at issue in Mattel qualify as
“inventions” for purposes of California’s statute when they are a
consumer product that has both creative and utilitarian elements.
A. Facts and Posture of Mattel
The Mattel case traces its roots to Mattel doll designer Carter
Bryant’s idea for a new line of dolls, which became Bratz. Until
October 2000, Bryant worked as a Barbie hair and clothing
designer for Mattel under a 1999 written employment
agreement. 103 Bryant promised to “promptly and fully as
practicable” assign all “inventions” to the company that were
“conceived or reduced to practice” by him at “any time during” his
employment. 104 The agreement defined “inventions” as including,
but not limited to, “all discoveries, improvements, processes,
101
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developments, designs, know-how, data computer programs and
formulae, whether patentable or unpatentable.” 105 The agreement
excluded inventions not assignable under the California statute. 106
While still working for Mattel, Bryant showed MGA
representatives initial sketches of the Bratz dolls, 107 created a
conceptual model (using Barbie parts), and created the names
“Bratz” and “Jade” (a name used for one of the dolls). 108 He later
signed a consulting agreement with MGA, creating an initial
“sculpt,” or mockup, for the Bratz during the period of his two
weeks’ notice at Mattel. 109
After Mattel discovered Bryant’s involvement with MGA, the
doll companies filed various lawsuits, which were consolidated in
federal district court. 110 The case proceeded to trial, where a jury
found MGA liable for copyright infringement. 111 The district court
awarded Mattel $10 million in damages and entered equitable
relief, including placing a constructive trust over all Bratz
trademarks and issuing an injunction prohibiting MGA from
producing most Bratz female fashion dolls, as well as dolls
substantially similar to Mattel’s copyrighted Bratz works. 112 The
Ninth Circuit subsequently vacated the equitable relief after
finding ambiguity in the assignment agreement. 113 On remand, the
district court held in response to Mattel’s motion for summary
judgment that a genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether
the company and Bryant mutually intended for the agreement to
assign to Mattel his rights to ideas conceived during
employment. 114 Finally in April 2011, a jury decided that Mattel
did not own the idea for Bratz. 115
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Id. Bryant settled with Mattel prior to trial.
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Mattel, Inc. v. MGA Entm’t, Inc., 782 F.Supp.2d 911 (C.D. Cal. 2011).
Pettersson, supra note 6.
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B. The Ninth Circuit Finds Ambiguity in the Agreement
The Ninth Circuit in Mattel changed the course of the litigation
in favor of MGA based on ambiguity in Bryant’s employment
agreement. Absent this ambiguity, however, Mattel had a
compelling case that it owned the Bratz invention, California’s
statute notwithstanding.
To retain control over the Bratz line, MGA needed to challenge
the validity of Bryant’s agreement purporting to assign ownership
of his inventions to Mattel. While MGA could have argued that the
agreement was unenforceable under California’s statute, such an
argument was unlikely to prevail, as discussed below. Instead,
MGA claimed that the terms of the agreement were ambiguous
regarding whether Bryant assigned: (1) inventions made off-theclock, 116 and (2) his mere ideas. 117
Mattel argued that the language “at any time” in the assignment
agreement meant Bryant was obligated to assign inventions
conceived or implemented while he was employed, regardless of
whether he was on the clock, so long as the assignment was not
barred by statute. 118 The trial court granted summary judgment for
Mattel. 119 The Ninth Circuit remanded, reasoning that the lower
court did not consider whether “Bryant worked on [Bratz] on his
own time [or] during his working hours at Mattel.” 120 The issue
should have been submitted to the jury to determine “(1) whether
Bryant’s agreement assigned works created outside the scope of
his employment at Mattel, and (2) whether Bryant’s creation of the
Bratz sketches and sculpt was outside the scope of his
employment.” 121
Mattel’s ownership claim also faltered because Bryant’s
agreement did not specifically list “ideas” as a subset of
“inventions.” Mattel argued that the list composing the definition
of “invention” was “illustrative rather than exclusive,” meaning it
116
117
118
119
120
121
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should include inventions at the idea stage. 122 Yet the court stated
that ideas are “markedly different from most of the listed
examples” because they are “ephemeral,” or not reduced to
practice like a computer program. 123 On the other hand, the court
noted that the agreement “lists less tangible inventions such as
‘know-how’ and ‘discoveries,’” and that Bryant could have agreed
to assign rights in innovations not concretized by assigning all
inventions merely “conceived.” 124
The court thus introduced common law principles of contract
interpretation into a case that, absent a finding of ambiguity, could
have been decided differently under California’s inventionassignment statute. For the statute to prevent assignment, Bryant
must not have used any of Mattel’s resources. 125 Evidence suggests
Bryant used Mattel supplies (in the form of doll parts for the
mockup, at least), and thus he did not make the invention entirely
on his own time because he had to at least secure those parts. The
new dolls clearly related to Mattel’s business, and especially to his
work as a doll designer. It is less clear whether the doll designs
stemmed from any particular projects at Mattel. Analysis of the
statutory elements suggests Mattel could have prevailed because
Bryant seemingly did not make the invention entirely on his own
time and without use of employee resources, and the invention
closely related to Mattel’s business. Thus, a court’s focus on
perceived ambiguity in the contract itself, rather than the statutory
factors, may benefit a defendant employee seeking to defeat an
assignment agreement.
C. Are Dolls “Inventions” for Statutory Purposes?
Had the Ninth Circuit analyzed ownership under California’s
statute, it is unclear whether Bryant’s idea for a new doll—a
product often perceived as protectable through copyright—was an
122
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“invention” for statutory purposes. However, classifying dolls and
similar products with both creative and utilitarian features as
inventions accords with the statute’s implicitly broad definition of
invention.
Dolls, like other consumer products such as furniture and
certain jewelry, often exhibit expressive features protectable by
copyright and utilitarian features protectable by patent. While dolls
may be copyrightable, 126 they are a type of toy and may be articles
of manufacture, one of the four categories of patentable subject
matter. 127 In this respect, they differ from traditional copyrightable
works of authorship, such as writings or photographs, which may
not be considered inventions. Dolls also differ from traditional
sculptures, which lack a functional element. One may obtain a
design patent for a doll, although there is no mention of attempts
by either party in Mattel to seek this protection, likely because
such patents are difficult to procure. 128
Note that even if an agreement assigning a doll idea or similar
invention is held unenforceable under state statute, the statutory
default ownership rule of copyright law (the work-for-hire
doctrine) may still afford the employer ownership of copyrightable
elements. Thus, had a court held the assignment agreement
between Mattel and Bryant unenforceable as to ownership of
certain copyrightable works, Mattel could have claimed ownership
of those works (and any derivative works) under the work-for-hire
doctrine.
CONCLUSION
Pre-invention assignment agreements provide employers with a
tool to reduce the uncertainty that existed at common law
regarding ownership of employee inventions. However, state
statutes limit how much of an employee’s inventive output
employers may capture without violating public policy. Although
126
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the majority of these statutes were ostensibly designed to protect
employees, they allow uncertainty to creep back into judicial
decisions in the form of whether an invention falls within the four
statutory criteria and thus belongs to the employee. Court decisions
under these statutes suggest that many inventions nonetheless
belong to employers because inventions are often held to “relate
to” the employer’s work. As a practical matter, one might question
how often these statutes will affect the ownership of employee
inventions, given that parties are likely to litigate only the closest
of cases. Nevertheless, the factors contained within the statutes
provide a useful framework to aid courts in making well-reasoned
decisions about ownership of inventions within the limits of public
policy. Application of the statutory factors may yield different
results than judicial interpretation of ambiguities within an
assignment agreement, as demonstrated by Mattel.
PRACTICE POINTERS
For attorneys advising employers:


Employers concerned about ownership of intellectual
property stemming from employees’ inventions should
include assignment provisions in employment contracts.
The employee should agree that all “Work Product”
conceived or reduced to practice—individually or jointly—
during employment relating to the employer’s current or
anticipated business or research belongs exclusively to the
employer. “Work Product” should be defined broadly and
defined as including, but not limited to, types of work the
particular employee is likely to produce, including:
inventions, plans, know-how, developments, discoveries,
and experimental processes. The agreement should specify
that, in addition to original Work Product, the employer
exclusively owns any and all copies, improvements, rights
and claims, tangible embodiments thereof, and rights in
patents, copyrights, trademarks, or other intellectual
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property rights anywhere in the world arising from that
Work Product. 129


Assignment provisions should clearly state that the
employee assigns (rather than merely agrees to assign later)
Work Product conceived or reduced to practice at any time
of day during employment, and Work Product made
without use of employer resources that relates to the
employer’s business or research.



When an employer seeks maximum ownership of employee
inventions, it may be useful to reference the relevant state
law and specify that the employee assigns all inventions not
prohibited by law. However, merely stating the inverse—
that an agreement does not cover inventions prohibited by a
Minnesota-type statute—likely is insufficient to effectuate
the maximum assignment.



Agreements in states with Minnesota-type statutes should
include notice of an employee’s statutory rights.



Attorneys alleging breach of an assignment agreement in
states following the Minnesota model should brief the four
statutory factors, focusing on the broad factor of inventions
that “relate to” the employee’s business.



Assignment agreements should specifically include “ideas”
among assigned inventions, if that is the parties’ intent.
Failure to clearly define inventions assigned may result in a
court looking to external evidence, such as industry custom,
to interpret perceived ambiguity in the agreement.

For attorneys advising employees:


129

Employees may bargain for pre-invention assignment
agreements that assign less than the maximum amount
allowed by state law. For example, an assignment provision

This language is adapted from Employee Confidentiality and
Proprietary Rights Agreement, PRACTICAL LAW COMPANY (2012),
http://us.practicallaw.com/6-501-1547.
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could exempt from assignment inventions in an employee’s
area of interest that relate to the employer’s business but
are outside of the scope of the employee’s work (e.g., a
software engineer who works on operating systems but
programs games as a hobby).


If subject to an assignment agreement, employees should
work on new business ventures only during off-hours and
without use of employer supplies or secrets. Specifically,
would-be inventors should refrain from using company
computers or other equipment to perform research,
communicate, or record ideas. Even without use of
employer resources, however, inventions that “relate to” an
employer’s work (construed broadly) or that stem from the
employee’s work, may nonetheless be assignable.



Even if an employee’s assignment agreement in a state with
a Minnesota-type statute purports to assign all inventions to
the employer, the attorney might focus on perceived
ambiguity in the agreement itself—rather than the four
statutory factors—in an attempt to invalidate the
agreement, or raise other contract law doctrines such as
lack of consideration.

